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Abstract: Thomas Aquinas’ intentions in his position that God acts through secondary causes are both laudable 
and correct. In affirming God’s action within secondary causes Thomas intended to affirm true freedom and 
contingency in the world and the creatures’ limited participation in God’s creative power. But his interpretation 
of these topics rests on assumptions about divinity that subvert his intentions. This article summarizes Thomas’ 
analysis and discusses the principal difficulties with his interpretation of God’s action. It then presents an 
interpretation of how Alfred North Whitehead’s position on divine action avoids these difficulties and achieves 
a more coherent understanding of God’s action in the world, even though it too requires revision. If Whitehead’s 
metaphysics is revised to think of creativity as the divine life rather than as ultimately distinct from God, then 
it, too, presents God as sharing the divine life with creatures by endowing them with the creativity and freedom 
to create themselves on the divinely-given ground of possibility. Thomas’ intentions and a revised Whiteheadian 
interpretation of divine action are compatible and complement each other on the topic of divine action in and 
through creatures and on the idea of existence as participation in the divine life.
Keywords: Thomas Aquinas, Whitehead, God‘s action, creativity, possibility, divine knowledge, freedom, 
contingency
The topic of God’s action in the world is a complex one that could conceivably include not just the doctrines of 
creation and providence, but also grace, salvation and eschatology. Although a complete discussion would 
touch on all of these, due to limitations of space I will restrict my discussion to divine action as considered 
in the traditional topics of creation and providence. When creation was thought of as a singular event that 
happened “once upon a time” in the past, the doctrine of providence focused on how God continued to 
interact with the world God had created. But when creation is understood to be an ongoing process, the 
concerns of the doctrines of creation and providence tend to merge or at least to be very strongly related. 
They are also closely related in the theology of Thomas Aquinas, but in a different way.
Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of God’s action in the world is intimately connected to his understanding 
of causality, God’s knowledge, God’s will, and how God creates. It is a testimony to his consistency that all 
these topics are connected so closely. I would affirm that Thomas’ intentions in his position that God acts 
through secondary causes are both laudable and correct. But Thomas’ interpretation of these topics rests 
on certain assumptions about divinity that I believe subvert his intentions. I will first summarize Thomas’ 
analysis and then discuss the principal difficulties with his interpretation of God’s action, especially 
through secondary causes. I will then present my interpretation of how Alfred North Whitehead’s position 
on divine action avoids these difficulties and achieves a more coherent understanding of God’s action in 
the world, even though it too requires revision. I will conclude with the claim that Thomas’ intentions and a 
revised Whiteheadian interpretation of divine action are compatible and that this offers a locus for fruitful 
discussion between Thomists and process theologians and philosophers.
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Thomas Aquinas on God’s Action in the World
Thomas affirms that God is present and active in all things, “as an agent is present to that upon which it 
acts.”1 This presence and action of God takes several forms in Thomas’ analysis. It is expressed in all four 
types of causality, as well as in Thomas’ affirmation that God both sustains secondary causes in existence 
and acts through them. God is the “final cause” or “end” (goal), drawing every operation of created agents 
to God. God is the first cause and necessary being, the source of all secondary and contingent efficient 
causes. God is the “unmoved mover” that in an ultimate sense “moves” all secondary causes to action. God 
is the ultimate “formal cause” in the sense that God gives to all secondary causes their “forms,” enabling 
and empowering them to be agents and to act in specific ways. God is also the Creator of all material causes 
(or matter). And finally, as Creator God conserves and sustains all material and secondary causes in their 
forms and powers. From all of this, Thomas concludes:
. . . it follows that God works intimately in all things. For this reason in Holy Scripture the operations of nature are attri-
buted to God as operating in nature, according to Job 10:11: “Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh; Thou hast put me 
together with bones and sinews.”2
This is a lovely vision of God’s presence and action in the created world and so long as one does not pursue 
critical questions too far, it seems to allow us to say that God acts in and through secondary causes. Each 
is active in its own way: God in the ways I have just summarized; while secondary causes, Thomas asserts, 
exercise true causal power as efficient causes.3 This gives the appearance of allowing the creatures of the 
world an independence and integrity of action of their own.4 But the position Thomas seems to intend 
here is actually subverted by several of his assumptions about divinity, his conclusions regarding God’s 
knowledge and will, and his understanding of how God creates.
As is well known, Thomas argues that God creates through God’s knowledge. For creatures, to be is 
to be known by God. In order to grasp the difficulties resulting from this position, we need to consider 
what Thomas says about God’s knowledge. First, Thomas states that in God the act of understanding—the 
operation producing knowledge—must be God’s essence and God’s being. This follows from God being pure 
act (without potentiality) and from God’s perfection, “because the act of understanding is the perfection 
and act of the one understanding.”5 If God’s act of understanding were something other than God’s essence 
and being, then that “something other” would be the perfection and act of the divine essence and the divine 
essence would stand in a relation of potentiality to an act other than itself. All of this is impossible since 
God must be pure act and perfect. Therefore, God’s act of understanding must be God’s essence and being.
From this conclusion a number of implications follow. If God’s act of understanding is God’s essence 
and being, then God’s knowledge must have exactly the same attributes as God’s essence and being: it 
must be simple, perfect, unchanging, eternal, not in dependence on anything other than God, unaffected 
by anything other than God, necessary, and so on. Thus God’s knowledge of all things is not dependent 
on anything other than God, and this is possible, Thomas argues, because in knowing Godself God knows 
all things.6 If this were not true, then God would be in dependence on creatures for God’s knowledge and 
this would compromise God’s perfection, aseity, and absoluteness. Furthermore, God’s knowledge must be 
creative, the cause of all things.7 But how can this be? In our experience, knowing depends on the existence 
1 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 8, a. 1. All quotations are from the English Dominican translation (New York: Benzinger 
Brothers, Inc., 1947). 
2 Ibid., 1a, q. 105, a. 5. 
3 See Ibid., Ia, q. 103, a. 6 & ad 2. 
4 Elizabeth A. Johnson, for example, has defended Thomas’ position on secondary causality as forming a basis for a contem-
porary theology of divine providence that can affirm chance, randomness, and “the free play of the undetermined realms of 
matter and spirit” in the universe as understood by contemporary science; Johnson, “Does God Play Dice?,” Theological Studies 
57 (1996): 3-18 (quotation from p. 18). 
5  Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 14, a. 4. 
6 Ibid., Ia, q. 14, a. 5, 6, & 7. 
7 Ibid., Ia, q. 14, a. 8. 
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of the known thing; or, as Aristotle puts it, “the knowable thing is prior to knowledge, and is its measure.”8 
It seems, then, that knowledge cannot be the cause of the known thing. Thomas answers this objection by 
arguing that God’s knowledge is fundamentally different than our knowledge. What Aristotle says is true 
of human knowledge, but God’s knowledge stands, as it were, on the other side of the known object: God’s 
knowledge is prior to and the measure of all knowable things, because God creates all knowable things by 
God’s knowledge of them.9 God’s knowledge is like that of an architect who builds a house and knows what 
it will be before the house actually exists.
If God’s knowledge is perfect, immutable, necessary, not in dependence on the world, and the cause of 
all things that exist, does this not imply that God’s knowledge imposes necessity on things? Does this not 
imply that there can be no truly contingent events? And most importantly, does this not imply that there 
is no freedom in the universe, not even in human beings? This would be a serious problem for Christian 
theology, because the reality of human freedom is absolutely crucial to the understanding of sin, which in 
turn forms the foundation for the doctrine of salvation and the understanding of the person and work of 
Jesus Christ. Therefore Thomas must resolve this apparent problem. He does so in an ingenious way, though 
the solution has serious difficulties. He argues that since God’s knowledge is eternal, and since “eternity, 
being simultaneously whole, comprises all time,”10 God knows all contingent events (including all of 
what are to us future contingent events) as present facts; and this means that God’s creative knowledge 
of contingent events is certain and necessary without imposing necessity on them. That is, the events in 
relation to their proximate causes in the temporal world are truly contingent in that they might have been 
otherwise; but since in eternity God “sees” not just possible outcomes of various proximate causes, but 
also what will actually happen, God’s knowledge is necessary and certain. This is similar to the way in 
which we can know past and present contingent events with certainty and necessity. For example, I can 
know with certainty that as I wrote this sentence I was sitting at my computer, even though I also know 
that I was perfectly free then to stand up and walk around. In this way, Thomas believes, both contingency 
and freedom are preserved without violating the necessity, immutability, perfection, and independence of 
God’s knowledge.
Thomas even provides an interesting analogy for God’s necessary knowledge of future contingent 
events.11 When you are travelling on a road, you cannot see what lies ahead of you on that road in the 
future, nor can you know who else in the future will start travelling on that road. But if you could get up 
high enough so that your vision could take in the entire road, then you could see at once all the travelers on 
the road. In a similar way, because eternity comprises all of time, God can know all past, present, and future 
contingent events as facts, and so know them with certainty and necessity, even though they occur as truly 
contingent events in the temporal world.
This analogy, however, and the underlying understanding of eternity’s relation to time, has a major 
flaw: it treats time as if it were space. Space is already fully extended in its three dimensions,12 so that for 
a sufficiently small finite segment of it one could see it all if one could gain a sufficiently distant vantage 
point. For example, an orbiting satellite can take in the entire length of the I-5 interstate highway from the 
Canadian to the Mexican borders along the west coast of the United States. Time, however, is fundamentally 
different from space in that, so far as we can judge from our experience, it is not already fully extended; the 
future is not yet actual, as the past and present are. The future is real, in the sense that we know something 
will occur; but it has not yet occurred, and so the future is real only as possibility and not as fact. It is hard 
to understand, then, how even God can know the future as fact, since it does not yet exist as fact. Or, if one 
wants to hold that God in eternity does know it as fact, it is hard to understand how this can avoid imposing 
8 Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX 1 (as cited by Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 14, a. 8 obj. 3). 
9 See Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 14, a. 8 ad 3. Thomas adds that God’s knowledge is the cause of all things insofar as God’s will is 
joined to it. See Ibid., Ia, q. 14, a. 8 & a. 9 ad 3. All of the major points made in his discussion of God’s knowledge are paralleled 
in his discussion of God’s will; see Ibid., Ia, q. 19. 
10 Ibid., Ia, q. 14, a. 13; see also Ia, q. 10, a. 2 ad 4. 
11 See Ibid., Ia, q. 14, a. 13 ad 3. 
12 I am aware that according to the current scientific understanding of the universe space is continually expanding, but for the 
purpose of discussing Thomas’ analogy, we may safely ignore this. 
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necessity on events. How can I be truly free to stand up and walk around ten minutes from now if God 
knows from all eternity that I will be sitting? I am not truly free to do anything other than what God knows 
from all eternity I will do. If I were, then I would have the power to make God’s knowledge mistaken; and 
this cannot be, because it would compromise the completeness and perfection of God’s knowledge. Thus 
despite Thomas’ attempt to affirm the truth of freedom and contingency in the world while retaining the 
position that God’s creative knowledge is necessarily eternal, independent, infallible, and unchanging, his 
solution is not coherent and does not succeed.
Thomas’ important argument for the understanding of God’s action in the world through natural 
agents unfortunately also suffers from incoherence. In Thomas’ thought this is expressed as the efficacy of 
secondary causes. There is no doubt that Thomas intended to affirm that created secondary causes actually 
have the power to cause, and thus participate in the divine creative power. For example, in discussing God’s 
providential governance of the world, Thomas says:
. . . whatsoever causes [God] assigns to certain effects, He gives them the power to produce those effects. . . . [T]here are 
certain intermediaries of God’s providence, for He governs things inferior by superior, not because of any defect in His 
power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures.13
Thomas does not mean that the agents of the created world are autonomous and independent causes 
operating apart from God. They are in fact agents of God’s action: God “governs some things by means 
of others.” And again, “God so governs things that He makes some of them to be causes of others in 
government,” allowing them to share in “the perfection of causality.”14 I believe Thomas intends to support 
a very important and beautiful idea here, the idea that creatures participate in a limited way in God’s own 
creativity, or to state it more generally, that created beings exist by participating in the divine being.
But there is a major incoherence in the way Thomas expresses this idea when we consider it in relation 
to God’s eternal, unchanging knowledge and will. In discussing the will of God, Thomas says:
Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but 
also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, so 
that there be a right order in things for the perfection of the universe. Therefore, to some effects He has attached unfailing 
necessary causes, from which the effects follow necessarily; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which 
the effects arise contingently. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God 
happen contingently; but God has prepared contingent causes for them because He has willed that they should happen 
contingently.15
This sounds so reasonable: there truly are contingent events because God wills them to happen contingently 
and “prepares” contingent secondary causes for them. But how can the contingent secondary causes truly be 
contingent in their effects and how can the contingent secondary causes truly have any independence and 
integrity of action of their own, if God from all eternity knows and wills the outcome? Since neither God’s 
will nor God’s knowledge can change (without compromising God’s perfection, aseity, and absoluteness, 
which is unthinkable for Thomas), there is no real possibility of the contingent secondary causes having 
any other effects than the ones God knows and wills from eternity. How can I really have freedom and 
independence to do something other than what God from all eternity knows with certain and unchanging 
knowledge and wills with perfect efficaciousness? We can call this contingency and free will all we want, we 
can say ceaselessly that divine providence does not impose necessity on those things God wills to happen 
contingently,16 but so long as God’s knowledge and God’s will must be eternal and unchanging, creative 
and perfectly efficacious, the result is indistinguishable from absolute determinism.
Thomas’ intent cannot be faulted: to affirm free will, contingency and the power of secondary causes 
in the universe is the correct position for Christian theology. It is correct to hold that God works through 
13 Ibid., Ia, q. 22, a. 3. 
14 Ibid., Ia, q, 103, a. 6 & ad 2. 
15 Ibid., Ia, q, 19, a. 8. 
16 Ibid., Ia, q. 22, a. 4 and Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 72.7. 
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secondary causes. And to hold that God allows the created agents of the universe to participate in God’s 
own creative power by granting them the ability to act as true causes is a beautiful expression of the ancient 
Christian conviction that all things exist by participating in the being or life of God. But the assumptions 
and implications of the Greek metaphysics that controls Thomas’ discussion subvert his intentions and 
create serious problems for the positions he wants to uphold. The trick of thinking that all of future time 
is somehow already “fact” for God in eternity—so that God can know every future event and being with 
perfect, necessary, and unchanging knowledge and will them with perfect efficaciousness, thus bringing 
them into being without imposing necessity on them and absolutely determining the course of universal 
history—this is in fact a trick. It is metaphysical sleight of hand distracting us from a major incoherence. It 
does not work.
Whitehead and God’s Action in the World
I cannot rehearse the details of Whitehead’s metaphysics here. Suffice it to say that in Whitehead’s 
metaphysics God’s primary action on the world is by the organization, valuation, presentation, and “lure” 
of possibilities. The Primordial Nature of God, Whitehead says, is the unconditioned grasping and valuation 
of all potentials or possibilities.17 This function of God establishes the basic order necessary for there to 
be any course of actual events, any universe, whatsoever. The order is the outcome of God’s valuation 
of all potentials or possibilities. This establishes not just the general metaphysical conditions and more 
specific conditions governing our universe,18 but also the relevance or irrelevance of every possibility to any 
particular standpoint in the actual world. Every possibility is included in God’s organization and valuation 
of the possibilities for the universe. This means that for any standpoint in the universe—which is, of course, 
a possibility that can be envisioned apart from any experience of the actual course of events—the relevant 
possibilities are “graded” in an order of value that reflects God’s preference: there will be one possibility 
for that specific situation that God values most highly, with varying valuations for the other possibilities, 
including one God values least (or even abhors).
God’s organization of possibilities is thus the ultimate ground of both order and novelty. God’s valuation 
of all possibilities establishes the ground of order (which is thus fundamentally an aesthetic order19) and 
the Primordial Nature of God serves as the limitless source of novel possibilities. God creates each actual 
entity in the universe not by determining what it shall be or by foreseeing what it shall be, but by making it 
really possible: endowing it with its possibilities and its ‘initial subjective aim,’ its ‘living immediacy’ as a 
becoming subject. The free and autonomous becoming of the actual entity in its situation is influenced by 
the attractiveness of the possibilities; the possibilities “lure” the actual entity to actualize them. The ‘initial 
subjective aim’ initially orients the becoming actual entity toward selecting the possibility God values most 
highly. This is because the ‘initial subjective aim’ also constitutes the actual entity’s initial standard of 
value, enabling it to experience and respond to value, and this is initially in harmony with God’s valuation 
of the possibilities open to that process of becoming.20
But the process of becoming is influenced by many factors in addition to the Primordial Nature of God. 
All past actual entities (which, it ought to be remembered, are actualized possibilities) to one degree or 
another influence the present process of becoming. In the course of its process of becoming, these other 
influences may exert a higher relative weight than the influence of God’s valuation of the possibilities. The 
becoming actual entity is free to alter its subjective aim and select any of the possibilities open to it, even 
the one God abhors. Thus although God’s creative influence on every actual entity is necessary for that 
actual entity to become, it is not determinative. In the end, the actual entity’s own selection or ‘decision’ 
17 See Whitehead, Process and Reality, 31; see also 40, 87-88, 247, 257, 344, 349. 
18 Whitehead argues that God’s Primordial Nature is responsible not just for the general metaphysical conditions, but also for 
more specific conditions, such as the dimensional character of the actual world. See Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 
255-57 and Process and Reality, 40, 46, 87-88, 108, 164, 207, 247, 257, 344-45. 
19 See Whitehead, Religion in the Making, 101. 
20 See Hosinski, Stubborn Fact, 164-76 for a detailed explanation of this point. 
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among the possibilities open to it is the ‘reason’ for what it becomes and that decision can be influenced in 
a variety of ways.
God acts internally in the becoming of every actual entity, by making it really possible and luring it 
toward actualizing the possibility God values most highly. God does not act externally upon actual entities 
or “societies” of actual entities as a competing agent. Although developed differently, I believe this position 
is quite similar to Thomas Aquinas’ intent in his argument that God acts in and through secondary causes. 
But there are also several important differences between Whitehead’s and Thomas’ positions that allow 
Whitehead’s position to avoid the incoherencies that, in my view, subvert Thomas’ intentions.
 Most importantly, in Whitehead’s metaphysics God does not create actual entities through God’s eternal 
and unchanging knowledge of them, but rather by envisioning every actual entity as possible and endowing 
each of them with all they need to determine or create themselves. There is, in short, a distinction between 
God’s understanding and God’s knowledge that reflects the distinction between mere possibility and fact. 
In Whitehead’s metaphysics, God’s understanding of all possibilities is eternal and unchanging and this 
makes possible an actual course of events and energizes every actual entity. But God’s knowledge arises 
from God’s experience of what actual entities have done with the possibilities God presented to them. Thus 
God’s knowledge does not occur as part of God’s role as Creator and can thus be dependent on creatures 
without compromising God’s perfection and independence and autonomy in God’s role as Creator.
In Whitehead’s metaphysics, in other words, creation does not mean either foreseeing or determining 
what any actual entity will be or what event will occur. Rather, divine creation is making possible an open 
and unfinished universe which will participate in God’s creative power by completing or creating itself on 
the divinely-given ground of possibility.21 Actual entities could not become without what they receive from 
God, but what they become is the result of their own free selection from among the possibilities open to 
them.
This view clearly implies that God cannot know the future (in the technical sense of the word ‘know’) 
until actual entities in fact terminate their processes of becoming in their own ‘decisions.’ God’s knowledge 
is dependent on the creatures of the world. God does not create through God’s knowledge of what the 
creature is or will be, but rather through the presentation of what it might be and the aim at becoming. The 
temporal actual entities create and determine themselves and God’s knowledge of them as facts arises from 
receiving the completed actual entities into God’s own experience. This account of divine knowledge is 
coherent with the ontology of actual entities and with Whitehead’s account of the possibility of knowledge 
in higher-grade actual entities.22 A Thomist might object that if God’s knowledge occurs in dependence on 
creatures, then it does compromise God’s absoluteness, perfection, and aseity and the entire understanding 
of divinity. In response I would note that Whitehead is thinking with a different understanding of perfection 
than the Greek philosophical tradition assumes. Perhaps the easiest way to explain this is by reference to 
the divine attributes.
It is not often noted by critics of process theology that in Whitehead’s philosophy of God the Primordial 
Nature of God has exactly the same attributes as the Christian tradition assigned to God. In the Primordial 
Nature God is infinite, complete, unconditioned, absolutely free, eternal, unchanging and impassible. 
These classical divine attributes express the conviction of both religious experience and philosophical 
reflection that God is the ultimate ground and source of the universe. But the tradition absolutized these 
attributes (in keeping with the Greek understanding of divinity) and tried to define all of God’s interaction 
with the universe from this basis, as we see in the theology of Thomas Aquinas. Whitehead’s metaphysics, 
in contrast, recognizes that the absolute aspect of God’s role as Creator is only a half-truth.
There is another aspect of God’s relation to the universe: if God is an actual entity, God must experience 
what the actual universe has become, what it has done with the possibilities God presented to it, and in this 
aspect God has the opposite attributes. Because of the nature of the universe and God’s ongoing experience 
of it, God’s Consequent Nature is finite, incomplete, conditioned, partially determined, everlasting, 
21 I am here already expressing a revision of Whitehead’s own interpretation of creativity, a revision I will explain below. 
22 See Hosinski, Stubborn Fact, 110-24, 192-93 for a summary of Whitehead’s account of the ontological bases of knowing and 
how his discussion of God’s knowledge coheres with this account. 
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developing, and passible. These “relative” attributes—the opposite of God’s “absolute” attributes—do not 
compromise God’s perfection, but show how God is the supreme illustration of the metaphysical principles, 
not an exception to them.23 Just as all actual entities must experience the universe of past actual entities, so 
does God; but in each attribute God is perfect in God’s receptivity. God may be finite, incomplete, conditioned, 
partially determined, and so on, but in each case God receives all past actual entities completely and in 
perfect sympathy, unlike the temporal actual entities and societies of the universe whose reception of past 
actual entities is imperfect and marked by limitations of perspective and exclusion.24 This view does not 
compromise God’s perfection but shows how God is the supreme illustration of the principles illustrated in 
all actual entities. Thus God’s perfection is not compromised. 
Because it is developed by analogy with the structure of actual entities, this understanding of the 
distinct aspects of God’s relation to the universe and of the different attributes of God in each aspect is 
a consistent and coherent metaphysical understanding of God. We can say that God is infinite and finite, 
unconditioned and conditioned, absolutely free and partially determined, impassible and passible, and so 
on,25 because we can specify which attribute applies to which aspect of God’s relation to and interaction 
with the universe. We need not try to derive every aspect of God’s relation to the universe from God’s role 
as Creator and the absolute attributes God must possess in that role. Whitehead’s metaphysics can show 
quite precisely, in a way Nicholas of Cusa’s could not, how it is possible for God to be the “coincidence of 
opposites.”
God acts in the universe, then, not by determining outcomes or by knowing what will occur, but rather 
by making all things possible and luring the freedom of the temporal agents of the universe toward the best 
possibility in their situations. I believe, however, that there is an incoherence in Whitehead’s position on 
creativity that must be revised if his view of divine action is to be compatible with the intent of the Christian 
tradition. In his book Religion in the Making, Whitehead wrote a sentence that has haunted me since I 
first read it: “The world lives by its incarnation of God in itself.”26 But in Process and Reality Whitehead 
separated creativity from God in a foundational way by stating that creativity is the metaphysical “ultimate” 
and God is its “primordial, non-temporal accident.”27 God and the world, Whitehead wrote, are both “in 
the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty.”28 Partially in order to deal 
with the problem of evil, Whitehead did not want the creativity of the universe, which drives all processes 
of becoming, to be thought of as coming entirely from God. So although he held that “God is the aboriginal 
instance of this creativity, and is therefore the aboriginal condition which qualifies its action,”29 he also 
held that temporal actual entities are creative in their own right, not because their creativity is a gift from 
God.
I believe that this separation of creativity from God subverts the profound implication of Whitehead’s 
own insight in Religion in the Making that “the world lives by its incarnation of God in itself.” If we were 
to revise Whitehead’s position, so that creativity were understood to be the divine life which God shares 
with the temporal agents of the world, then Whitehead’s metaphysics would be rendered compatible with 
the intent of the Christian theological tradition in its position on creatio ex nihilo and its affirmation of 
monotheism, as Langdon Gilkey argued many years ago.30 It would then also be compatible with the intent 
of Thomas Aquinas’ argument that God shares with creatures the power of creativity or causality in acting 
through secondary causes.
23 See Whitehead, Process and Reality, 343: “. . .God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked 
to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification.” 
24 See Whitehead, Process and Reality, 345-46 and Hosinski, Stubborn Fact, 193-95. 
25 See Whitehead’s “antitheses” between God and the world, which reveal that God has opposite attributes depending on 
which aspect of God’s relation to the universe is being considered, in Process and Reality, 348. 
26 Whitehead, Religion in the Making, 149. 
27 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 7; see also 31, 88, 225, 349; and Hosinski, Stubborn Fact, 208-12 for an analysis of Whitehead’s 
position on creativity. 
28 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 349. 
29 Ibid., 225. 
30 See Gilkey, Reaping the Whirlwind, 112-14, 248-51, 300-18, 414 n34. See also Neville, Creativity and God. 
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In affirming God’s action within secondary causes Thomas Aquinas’ intended to affirm true freedom 
and contingency in the world and the creatures’ limited participation in God’s creative power. Whitehead’s 
metaphysics affirms true freedom and contingency in the universe in its understanding of God as creating 
by making possible an open and unfinished universe which is allowed to determine itself and complete 
its creation in freedom. If Whitehead’s metaphysics is revised to think of creativity as the divine life rather 
than as ultimately distinct from God, then it, too, presents God as sharing the divine life with creatures 
by endowing them with the creativity and freedom to create themselves on the divinely-given ground of 
possibility. In such a revised Whiteheadian metaphysics, no actual entity or society of actual entities can 
become or exist without its creative basis, which comes directly from God; but each actual entity and society 
enjoys a limited freedom to complete its own creation. God creates creatures as co-creators. I believe that 
Thomas Aquinas’ intentions and a revised Whiteheadian metaphysics complement each other on the topic 
of divine action in and through creatures and on the idea of existence as participation in the divine life. This 
offers a topic on which Thomists and process theologians might have a fruitful discussion.
Finally, although I do not have the space to develop this point here, it seems clear to me that this topic 
has important implications for understanding the importance of our care for the natural environment. Both 
Whitehead and Thomas Aquinas affirm that God acts through all agents in the universe, not just human 
beings. If we are persuaded that God is at work in nature, and even more that God values the natural world, 
then it immediately becomes clear to us that there is a sacrality or sacredness to the natural world that 
we dare not ignore or overlook. This in turn implies that our actions affecting the natural world have a 
moral character. In fact the distinction between actions affecting human beings and actions affecting the 
natural world is ultimately a false distinction. There is a unity to the universe and all our actions have 
moral character and consequences, whether they are directed at other human beings or at the natural world 
of which we are a part. Our treatment of the physical environment, then, becomes a religious question 
of ultimate importance since God is at work in nature. There is a rich religious basis for the concerns of 
environmental theology.
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